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cricketfan
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 Geplaatst: do 30 sep 2010 11:41 Onderwerp: Art. 1:160 BW |
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Dear forum members,
I hope you will excuse me writing in English - please feel free to reply/discuss in Dutch: I have no problem reading it.
I wonder how to deal with the last criterion that comes from the jurisprudence from the Hoge Raad, namely to prove a "gemeenschappelijke huishouding".
In a number of recent decisions that can be read on the rechtspraak.nl website, the petition of the alimony payer fails on this last criterion, even though the longterm affective relationship and cohabitation have been (relatively easily) proved, e.g. by witness statements, licensed detective agency reports, or a combination of the two.
A particular case in point is this recent decision of the Gerechtshof in Den Haag (LJN: BM5034): "8. Het hof is voorts van oordeel dat de man onvoldoende heeft aangetoond om voorshands te kunnen oordelen dat de vrouw en [B.] samenwonen als waren zij gehuwd, nu onvoldoende aannemelijk is geworden dat zij elkaar wederzijds verzorgen... Nu uit de onderzoeksrapportage van De Rijk naar voren komt dat de vrouw en [B.] gezamenlijk, doch ook ieder afzonderlijk boodschappen doen en de man zijn stelling niet nader met financiële stukken heeft onderbouwd, kan op basis van de overgelegde stukken naar het oordeel van het hof niet zonder meer worden aangenomen dat de vrouw en [B.] een gezamenlijke huishouding voeren. Ook overigens heeft de man naar het oordeel van het hof niet inzichtelijk gemaakt op welke wijze de vrouw en [B.] elkaar wederzijds verzorgen.
In quite a large number of published decisions in the last year or two (too many to quote), depending apparently on the appeal court and the judges involved, there has been an additional hearing scheduled and the onus put on the alimony recipient to prove that, in particular, there is not a "gemeenschappelijke huishouding". For instance, one detective company makes particular reference to this: http://www.bureauderijk.nl/Voorbeeld%20uitspraak%20rechtbank%20omgekeerde%20bewijslast.pdf
However, the Hoge Raad (LJN: BM1075, Hoge Raad , 09/01690) appears to have recently quashed this approach and re-emphasised that the burden of proof lies entirely with the alimony payer: "
6. Het cassatiemiddel richt zich met onderdeel 1.12 tegen de beschikking van 28 januari 2009. Het klaagt dat het hof, door te oordelen dat de vrouw niet is geslaagd in het leveren van het aan haar opgedragen bewijs, heeft miskend dat het niet aan de vrouw was het ontbreken van financiële verwevenheid te bewijzen."
See also LJN: BM1076, Hoge Raad , 08/04284 §12-16, which seems to reconfirm that the burden of proof lies with the payer.
Lastly, I observe that a very recent decision from the Gerechtshof Leeuwarden (LJN: BN8444), appears to aptly highlight for the first time the crux of the problem in §37: "37. Ten slotte dient te worden beoordeeld of er sprake is van een gemeenschappelijke huishouding. Het hof stelt vast dat uit de door de man overgelegde stukken niet kan blijken van een financiële verwevenheid. Het hof merkt echter op dat het in de meeste situaties voor de alimentatieplichtige ondoenlijk is om de financiële verwevenheid te bewijzen, aangezien de alimentatieplichtige over het algemeen niet de beschikking heeft over de financiële stukken van de alimentatiegerechtigde. Daar staat in de onderhavige zaak tegenover dat de stelling van de vrouw - dat van een gemeenschappelijke huishouding geen sprake is - niet controleerbaar is. "
In this particular case, because the recipient was shown to be inconsistent in her stories re. the other criteria, the court concluded she was not to be trusted and chose to effectively waive scrutiny of this last crucial criterion, so regrettably the real problem did not get the attention it deserves.
Any ideas/comments? |
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bona fides
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Studieomgeving (BA): UL
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| Geplaatst: do 30 sep 2010 14:47 Onderwerp: Re: Art. 1:160 BW |
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| cricketfan schreef: | However, the Hoge Raad (LJN: BM1075, Hoge Raad , 09/01690) appears to have recently quashed this approach and re-emphasised that the burden of proof lies entirely with the alimony payer: "
6. Het cassatiemiddel richt zich met onderdeel 1.12 tegen de beschikking van 28 januari 2009. Het klaagt dat het hof, door te oordelen dat de vrouw niet is geslaagd in het leveren van het aan haar opgedragen bewijs, heeft miskend dat het niet aan de vrouw was het ontbreken van financiële verwevenheid te bewijzen." |
I think you're misreading this decision. Point 6 is from the advisory opinion of the advocate-general (A-G). The A-G actually considers that "het cassatiemiddel" should fail, i.e. that the decision of the appeal court that the woman should prove lack of "financiële verwevenheid" is correct (or rather: not incorrect... a judge has some discretion in such matters). The HR apparently agrees with the A-G, since it rejects the woman's cassation appeal. The HR applies art. 81 RO, hence does not give reasons, which basically means it doesn't find the case very interesting.
| Quote: | | See also LJN: BM1076, Hoge Raad , 08/04284 §12-16, which seems to reconfirm that the burden of proof lies with the payer. |
Also in this case the woman loses her cassation appeal.
As a starting point, the burden of proof lies with the party that asserts that the conditions of art. 1:160 BW are fulfilled. However, if that party makes a sufficiently credible case, it seems that judges are willing (and allowed) to shift the burden of proof of (the absence of) "financiële verwevenheid" to the other party.
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cricketfan
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| Geplaatst: do 30 sep 2010 16:55 Onderwerp: Re: Art. 1:160 BW |
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| bona fides schreef: |
Also in this case the woman loses her cassation appeal.
As a starting point, the burden of proof lies with the party that asserts that the conditions of art. 1:160 BW are fulfilled. However, if that party makes a sufficiently credible case, it seems that judges are willing (and allowed) to shift the burden of proof of (the absence of) "financiële verwevenheid" to the other party. |
OK, I think I get it, but I do see a highly contradictory attitude between, from §14 (and §16) of LJN: BM1076, Hoge Raad, 08/04284
"Naar zijn oordeel, een oordeel dat ik onderschrijf, kan niet op basis van de redelijkheid en billijkheid als algemene regel van bewijslastverdeling worden aanvaard dat in gevallen van een vaststaande samenwoning de betrokken alimentatiegerechtigde ex-echtgenoot het ontbreken van de beide andere elementen van de in art. 1:160 BW bedoelde samenleving (de wederzijdse verzorging en de gemeenschappelijke huishouding) zou moeten bewijzen. Hij voegt daaraan toe dat de eisen van de redelijkheid en billijkheid slechts ruimte laten voor op bijzondere omstandigheden van het concrete geval te baseren uitzonderingen op de hoofdregel van art. 150 Rv."
Considering that the Gerechtshof Leeuwarden recently wrote in §37 of LJN: BN8444 the general obvious observation that: "Het hof merkt echter op dat het in de meeste situaties [u]voor de alimentatieplichtige ondoenlijk is om de financiële verwevenheid te bewijzen[/u], aangezien de alimentatieplichtige over het algemeen niet de beschikking heeft over de financiële stukken van de alimentatiegerechtigde. Daar staat in de onderhavige zaak tegenover dat de stelling van de vrouw - dat van een gemeenschappelijke huishouding geen sprake is - niet controleerbaar is. "
Since this is self-evidently the normal situation, why, I wonder, does the Hoge Raad persist in seeing that it is not generally reasonable to reverse the burden of proof in this matter, but only exceptionally, according to special circumstances of a specific case?
While I'm on the subject, in §14 of LJN: BM1076, there is a reference to a 1982 HR decision that defined the "gemeenschappelijke huishouding": "In dat verband wordt ook gesproken van "die volledige, tot lotsverbondenheid leidende levensgemeenschap, welke het kenmerk is van een normaal huwelijk" (HR 2 april 1982, LJN AG4364, NJ 1982, 374, m.nt. EAAL).
Whereas in this recent Gerechtshof Den Haag decision (LJN: BM8199), the judges decided: "11. Uit het voorgaande vloeit voort dat naar het oordeel van het hof sprake is van lotsverbondenheid... 13. .... Op basis van de overgelegde stukken kan wel worden vastgesteld, dat sprake is van enige en wellicht toenemende mate van verzorging, maar niet kan worden vastgesteld, dat de vrouw en de heer [X] thans een zodanig financiële betrokkenheid hebben, dat zij geacht worden een gezamenlijke huishouding te voeren."
If the HR considered that gemeenschappelijke/gezamenlijke huishouding was a characteristic state on the way to demonstrating "lotsverbondenheid", how can this last decision declare "lotsverbondenheid" present, but not gemeenschappelijke/gezamenlijke huishouding? |
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bona fides
Geslacht:
Studieomgeving (BA): UL
Studieomgeving (MA): UL
Berichten: 22911
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| Geplaatst: vr 08 okt 2010 1:45 Onderwerp: Re: Art. 1:160 BW |
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| cricketfan schreef: | | OK, I think I get it, but I do see a highly contradictory attitude between, from §14 (and §16) of LJN: BM1076, Hoge Raad, 08/04284 |
I must admit I was a bit too hasty.
However, I do think LJN: BN8444 can be reconciled with LJN: BM1076.
| Gerechtshof schreef: | | 38. Uit het voorgaande - waarbij alle omstandigheden in onderling verband en onderlinge samenhang zijn beschouwd - leidt het hof af dat de vrouw en [samenwonende met de vrouw] een duurzame affectieve relatie hebben, met elkaar samenwonen, elkaar wederzijds verzorgen en een gemeenschappelijke huishouding voeren, zodat sprake is van samenleving in de zin van artikel 1:160 BW. Het hof acht de stellingen van de man hierover voldoende onderbouwd en door de vrouw niet alleen onvoldoende gemotiveerd betwist, maar ook, voor zover al betwist, die betwisting ongeloofwaardig. (...) |
What the Gerechtshof states here, is that the woman did not contest the facts asserted by the man in a believable manner (in fact she has lied multiple times, see §33). Therefore evidence for or against the asserted facts is not even required:
| art. 149 lid 1 Rv schreef: | | Tenzij uit de wet anders voortvloeit, mag de rechter slechts die feiten of rechten aan zijn beslissing ten grondslag leggen, die in het geding aan hem ter kennis zijn gekomen of zijn gesteld en die overeenkomstig de voorschriften van deze afdeling zijn komen vast te staan. Feiten of rechten die door de ene partij zijn gesteld en door de wederpartij niet of niet voldoende zijn betwist, moet de rechter als vaststaand beschouwen, behoudens zijn bevoegdheid bewijs te verlangen, zo vaak aanvaarding van de stellingen zou leiden tot een rechtsgevolg dat niet ter vrije bepaling van partijen staat. |
I guess this is how §37, regarding the element of financiële verwevenheid, should be understood.
| Quote: | | Since this is self-evidently the normal situation, why, I wonder, does the Hoge Raad persist in seeing that it is not generally reasonable to reverse the burden of proof in this matter, but only exceptionally, according to special circumstances of a specific case? |
The A-G states that it is not reasonable to, as a general rule, reverse the burden of proof, and adds that a reversal is only possible when based on special circumstances of the specific case.
In LJN: BM1076 the A-G concluded that the Gerechtshof had in fact not reversed the burden of proof, but had determined that the man had provisionally succeeded in proving his case, and that the woman had not succeeded in giving counter-evidence. Presumably, this is what the HR agreed with, in which case the HR did not even need to consider the question of when it is justified to reverse the burden of proof.
_________________
Hanc marginis exiguitas non caperet. |
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bona fides
Geslacht:
Studieomgeving (BA): UL
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Berichten: 22911
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| Geplaatst: vr 08 okt 2010 2:27 Onderwerp: Re: Art. 1:160 BW |
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| cricketfan schreef: | | While I'm on the subject, in §14 of LJN: BM1076, there is a reference to a 1982 HR decision that defined the "gemeenschappelijke huishouding": "In dat verband wordt ook gesproken van "die volledige, tot lotsverbondenheid leidende levensgemeenschap, welke het kenmerk is van een normaal huwelijk" (HR 2 april 1982, LJN AG4364, NJ 1982, 374, m.nt. EAAL). |
I'm not sure I agree. It seems to me that "volledige, tot lotsverbondenheid leidende levensgemeenschap, welke het kenmerk is van een normaal huwelijk" should be seen as a reformulation of the criterion of art. 1:160 BW ("samenleven met een ander als waren zij gehuwd"). However, I do agree that §11 of LJN: BM8199 is a bit weird.
LJN: BM8199 correctly lists the elements required by art. 1:160 BW in §9:
- duurzame affectieve relate;
- wederzijds verzorgen;
- samenwonen;
- gemeenschappelijke huishouding.
"Duurzame affectieve relatie" is dealt with in §10. "Wederzijds verzorgen" en "gemeenschappelijke huishouding" are dealt with in §12 and §13. So §11 only has to deal with "samenwonen". I'm therefore not sure why "lotsverbondenheid" is mentioned in §11. What makes §11 even less understandable is:
| Quote: | | Aldus concludeert het hof, dat sprake is van samenwoning als ware zij gehuwd. |
If that's the case, then we're finished: this is all that art. 1:160 BW requires. (Well, unless "ware" is not a typo for the subjunctive plural "waren" but really meant as a singular subjunctive, and the Gerechtshof really meant to say that the woman, but not necessarily the man, lived together as if she were married. Or is "samenwoning als ware[n] zij gehuwd" not the same as "samenleven als waren zij gehuwd"?)
For the moment I think the Gerechtshof is overly complicating the matter in §11. It should simply have concluded that there was "samenwoning".
| Quote: | | If the HR considered that gemeenschappelijke/gezamenlijke huishouding was a characteristic state on the way to demonstrating "lotsverbondenheid", how can this last decision declare "lotsverbondenheid" present, but not gemeenschappelijke/gezamenlijke huishouding? |
As I said, I'm not convinced that this really is the position of the HR (although you might be right... I have not looked at the 1982 decision), but something does seem wrong to me as well in the the decision of the Gerechtshof.
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cricketfan
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| Geplaatst: vr 08 okt 2010 10:05 Onderwerp: |
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Actually, Art 1:160 BW doesn't mention samenwoning als ware zij gehuwd at all, it mentions samenleven als ware zij gehuwd - samenwoning is just one sub-criterion.
My point about the reversal of burden of proof: Clearly, as the Gerechtshof Leeuwarden has pointed out, the person seeking an end to spousal support under Art. 1:160 BW has quite a job to do to bring proof to the table. Working with detectives it seems to be (relatively) straightforward to demonstrate the first two criteria, the long-term affective relationship and the actual cohabitation. The third, it seems, can be also shown, though perhaps with a little more difficulty, by photographic evidence from the detectives - for example, the new partner is helping with the gardening (if there even is a garden), or lending his car to the woman, she cooks dinner...(?). However, the fourth criterion cannot normally be proven by the alimony payer, as eloquently pointed out by the Gerechtshof Leeuwarden in LJN: BN8444, because it is not possible to get hold of the financial documents (bank statements and the like) of the alimony recipient and/or the new partner without committing a criminal act.
Another fairly recent case (from 2009) - LJN: BJ3060 - shows that it is quite possible for the detectives to be prosecuted for overstepping the mark in merely observing.
So how can the HR reasonably state that in such cases it is still generally reasonable that the entire burden of proof lies with the alimony payer, implicitly therefore with regard to all four criteria, especially the last?
I agree that LJN: BM8199 is a bit weird. Actually I think it's worse. What concerns me is that a number of Gerechtshof decisions on such Art. 1:160 BW cases, especially from Gerechtshof Den Haag, are (at least) a bit weird. Considering the sums at stake and the vast sums that have to be expended in terms of lawyers' and detectives' fees to even get to a Gerechtshof decision, it does not seem reasonable from the point of view of the one seeking justice that there is not a clearly systematic and fairly balanced procedure in place, such that the likelihood of success can be reasonably accurately predicted beforehand.
A letter written to the Minister of Justie on 26 July 2002 by mr van Dijk of the Raad voor de Rechtspraak
(http://www.rechtspraak.nl/NR/rdonlyres/DA72C81F-637C-4747-BB87-1214D9881ECA/0/aaaart160BW.pdf) stated that there was no need for any changes to the law or further guidelines, essentially because the "jurisprudentie .... inmiddels is uitgekristalliseerd. Hiermee is de rechtszekerheid in ieder geval op dit moment voldoende gediend." 
With reference to not only the above referenced decisions but also several others, once again I cannot see that "rechtszekerheid" is any way "voldoende gediend", not even now in 2010 following the intervening additional jurisprudence. |
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cricketfan
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| Geplaatst: wo 08 dec 2010 10:47 Onderwerp: Art. 1:160 BW (continued) |
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Just to highlight a recent example of my point about the huge amount of money that has to be invested, please read the following:
http://alimentatie.startpagina.nl/prikbord/7020043/13208860/re-alimentatiefraude-en-recherchebureau#msg-13208860
How is it that the Dutch public considers that it is acceptable justice that the person who is paying the defrauding alimony recipient has to incur such costs? And there are no criminal or other punitive consequences for the defrauding alimony recipient?
On another topic, the term "gemeenschappelijke huishouding" is sometimes used, but on other occasions a more-or-less equivalent term that effectively translates to "economic unit" in English is used, i.e. the judge supposedly is looking to see if the alimony recipient and the new partner form an "economic unit" as the final, and often decisive, criterion.
But in so many cases, there is a "LAT-relatie" formed because it is a straightforward calculation to the couple who wish to live substantially off the ex-husband of the alimony recipient that the netto partneralimentatie received is considerably higher than one of the two sets of monthly living expenses (rent etc.) of the two separate addresses maintained in the context of the convenient "LAT-relatie". Thus, by not forming an overtly recorded "economic unit" they are actually forming the most economic "economic unit", which, based on the actual meaning of the phrase, should be taken into consideration, i.e. the couple are making the most efficient use of the resources/income streams available to them net their minimised outgoings (e.g. one of them gets the cheapest flat to rent possible - and barely ever actually stays in it -as close as possible to the abode of the other). But from what I see in the case law, pretty much any judge in this country would most likely throw this out because there would be no evidentiary documentation possible of the formation of an "economic unit" along the lines of a joint household, simply because doing so would for them be UNeconomic.
I would also be interested to see a lively discussion of how the alimony payor is supposed to in fact obtain such documentary evidence without breaking the law, or without getting a third party to break the law on his behalf. |
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cricketfan
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| Geplaatst: di 05 jul 2011 11:47 Onderwerp: |
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Some of the underlying issues seem to have recently attracted some further detailed attention:
http://www.banning.nl/3947/home-nl/publicaties/de-bewijslast-in-artikel-1-160-bw-procedures.html
It seems there may be a (sensible(?)) trend amongst certain judges toward taking it as read that if there is an "affectieve relatie" that is "duurzaam" and that there is "feitelijk samenwoning" then there must surely be "wederzijdse verzorging" and "gemeenschappelijke huishouding".
The issue in fact clearly requires closer scrutiny, debate and analysis from the opposite point of view. How, precisely, is it possible that a couple having an affective relationship for a long time ("duurzaam" need only be a few months, but let's say for sake of argument that it's a few years) and actually cohabit, i.e. live at the same residence, do not in any significant way whatsoever demonstrate "wederzijdse verzorging" and a "gemeenschappelijke huishouding".
What sort of a relationship would that be in fact? Has any forum member ever met a couple living together like that??? |
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bona fides
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| Geplaatst: di 05 jul 2011 20:54 Onderwerp: |
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| cricketfan schreef: | | So how can the HR reasonably state that in such cases it is still generally reasonable that the entire burden of proof lies with the alimony payer, implicitly therefore with regard to all four criteria, especially the last? |
You mean A-G, not HR, and I don't think this is what the A-G is saying. The A-G only states that it is not the case that as a general rule (i.e. based on law, not on facts) the burden of proof is reversed, and that special circumstances (i.e. facts) are needed for a reversal. It's quite possible that the same "special circumstances" occur in many of these cases in respect of "financiële verwevenheid".
| Quote: | | How is it that the Dutch public considers that it is acceptable justice that the person who is paying the defrauding alimony recipient has to incur such costs? And there are no criminal or other punitive consequences for the defrauding alimony recipient? |
Depending on the case there might very well be criminal consequences. Incurred costs can be claimed (art. 6:96 lid 2 sub c BW).
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cricketfan
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| Geplaatst: wo 06 jul 2011 9:38 Onderwerp: |
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| Quote: | It's quite possible that the same "special circumstances" occur in many of these cases in respect of "financiële verwevenheid".
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That's really my point. There have been enough of these cases over the years to the point that, combined with the accepted jurisprudence of the HR that "gemeenschappelijke huishouding" has to be proved and that it is still in principle the payor of the alimony who has to prove this, and yet it is clearly logical that the payor cannot normally do this without being a criminal, i.e. breaking and entering or electronically hacking the presumed cohabiting parties' accounts.
So it's perplexing to me that the HR and/or A-G cannot go to the point of stating that when it comes to this proving this final, and clearly from the jurisprudence most supremely critical HR-mandated criterion of "samenleven as waren zij gehuwd", it is in fact completely reasonable that the burden of proof should be in general reversed. Or to put it another way, if the first four criteria have been established/proved (affectieve relatie, deze van duurzaam aard, feitelijke samenwonen, wederzijdse verzorging) then it is in general reasonable to assume that the final one, gemeenschappelijke huishouding, can in general be assumed to be fulfilled and that there is then a general principle of reversing the burden of proof on that last point. In fact, I should rather see it that the first three criteria should be sufficient, especially if, as I wrote in the previous post, the relationship is significantly long term (i.e. years). What "affectieve relaties" exist for years without some significant measure of "wederzijdse verzorging"? Is it not in fact implicit in the definition of what normal people regard as a long-term affective relationship?
| Quote: | | Depending on the case there might very well be criminal consequences. Incurred costs can be claimed (art. 6:96 lid 2 sub c BW). |
I've not seen any cases at all in the jurisprudence where incurred costs (detective, legal fees etc.) have been awarded to be paid by the defrauding alimony recipient to the defrauded alimony payor who was otherwise successful with his Art. 1:160 BW-based case. If you have a reference that shows otherwise, I'd be glad to read it.
On the contrary, what I do read all too often is that the alimony recipient although in principle ordered to repay alimony illegally taken from a date in the past determined by the (appeal) court, is let off the hook, because she's "already spent it" (no doubt quite often on nice holidays with the new partner...). So she gets off scot free for her past deceptive and fraudulent behaviour, and with regard to the illegally taken money and what she enjoyed with it, you could argue, in fact quite handsomely rewarded for said behaviour.
How does that equate to justice? |
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bona fides
Geslacht:
Studieomgeving (BA): UL
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Berichten: 22911
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| Geplaatst: wo 06 jul 2011 11:54 Onderwerp: |
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| cricketfan schreef: | | Quote: | | Depending on the case there might very well be criminal consequences. Incurred costs can be claimed (art. 6:96 lid 2 sub c BW). |
I've not seen any cases at all in the jurisprudence where incurred costs (detective, legal fees etc.) have been awarded to be paid by the defrauding alimony recipient to the defrauded alimony payor who was otherwise successful with his Art. 1:160 BW-based case. If you have a reference that shows otherwise, I'd be glad to read it. |
I should have said that these costs can be claimed provided that the alimony recipient acted illegally by not properly informing the alimony payer (and I should have written 6:96 lid 1 sub b, not sub c). According to Hof Den Bosch 22 december 2009, LJN BK8009, this will in general be the case if the payer was actually paying alimony:
| Hof schreef: | Het hof vat, evenals de rechtbank, de vordering van [geïntimeerde] aldus op dat deze aan zijn vordering ten grondslag legt dat [appellante] gehouden was gedurende de periode waarin [geïntimeerde] alimentatie aan haar diende te betalen - eigener beweging - aan hem mee te delen dat er sprake was van een dergelijk samenwonen. Anders dan de rechtbank is het hof evenwel van oordeel dat een dergelijke verplichting tussen ex-echtgenoten in zijn algemeenheid niet kan worden aanvaard. Of een dergelijke mededelingsplicht bestaat is afhankelijk van de omstandigheden van het geval (vgl. HR 31 maart 1978, NJ 1978, 363).
Indien de situatie aldus was geweest, dat [geïntimeerde] aan [appellante] daadwerkelijk de alimentatie betaalde die hij verschuldigd was, terwijl het voor [appellante] duidelijk was of redelijkerwijs moest zijn dat de omstandigheden op grond waarvan zij alimentatie ontving dusdanig waren gewijzigd dat zij niet langer op die alimentatie aanspraak kon maken, kan in beginsel worden aangenomen dat [appellante] verplicht was dit aan [geïntimeerde] mee te delen dan wel die betalingen te retourneren. Die situatie doet zich hier echter niet voor. Als niet weersproken staat vast dat [geïntimeerde] aan [appellante] al geruime tijd vóór 1 november 2005 geen alimentatie meer betaalde, en het enkele feit dat hij een alternatief voorstel heeft gedaan voor een betaling ineens neemt niet weg dat het niet meedelen door [appellante] niet tot gevolg heeft gehad dat [geïntimeerde] betalingen heeft verricht aan [appellante] die onverschuldigd bleken. |
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Hanc marginis exiguitas non caperet. |
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cricketfan
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| Geplaatst: wo 06 jul 2011 12:13 Onderwerp: |
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That's an interesting one, but still not what I'm looking for, i.e. an actual success story. Here he initially won, but then lost in the appeal case. And there is some very fuzzy language that indicates that the court was thinking she could be let off the hook if she "didn't necessarily realise that the case would definitely be one of Art. 1:160 BW" which would be a very easy excuse to make if, for example, there is a formal appearance of a "LAT relatie", i.e. two separate addresses maintained (naturally, deliberately at an additional cost of less than the netto partneralimentatie...).
It also shows that the family court seems not to be competent and yet another case is necessary before a different court.
It's not clear to me why in the initially successful verdict the additional legal fees were not considered as a potential part of the damages.
So obviously the guy incurred yet more legal fees for the handelszaak. One has to presume that they were less than the legal fees for the family case of over 18,000 otherwise the initial "victory" was totally pyrrhic.
The end result was he needlessly paid yet more legal fees and didn't get the detective fees paid back. I guess the lawyers would still be pretty happy
Any actual genuine success stories documented in the jurisprudence I wonder? |
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bona fides
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| Geplaatst: wo 06 jul 2011 14:17 Onderwerp: |
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| cricketfan schreef: | | It's not clear to me why in the initially successful verdict the additional legal fees were not considered as a potential part of the damages. |
See art. 241 Rv:
| Quote: | | Ter zake van verrichtingen waarvoor de in de artikelen 237 tot en met 240 bedoelde kosten een vergoeding plegen in te sluiten, zoals die ter voorbereiding van gedingstukken en ter instructie van de zaak, kan jegens de wederpartij geen vergoeding op grond van artikel 96, tweede lid, van Boek 6 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek worden toegekend, maar zijn alleen de regels betreffende proceskosten van toepassing. |
Btw, it seems we've discussed this case before.
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Hanc marginis exiguitas non caperet. |
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cricketfan
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| Geplaatst: wo 06 jul 2011 14:36 Onderwerp: |
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Thanks for the reminder...
Btw, regarding your observation at the time...
| Quote: | If the claimant had claimed repayment of some of the alimony, and this claim had been awarded, the costs of hiring the detective bureau would also have been awarded. (This probably goes without saying, but note that in general it will have to be shown that those costs were reasonable. E.g. you can't hire a detective bureau and expect to claim the costs on your ex if you haven't first simply asked your ex whether she is living with another partner.)
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... the question arises: is the payor in fact doomed to fail, because doing so (i.e. directly asking the question) would in most cases amount to a blatant tip-off that a detective investigation is likely to follow, giving the recipient and her partner ample time to cover their tracks and act in a manner optimised towards evading detectives/avoiding allowing them the quantity and/or nature of the evidence that's necessary.
In a more straightforward criminal fraud case, would it be necessary to ask the suspected criminal if he or she has committed a crime before using detectives to obtain evidence, in order to ensure that damages for the necessary detective work could later on be succesfully obtained?
Again, it is sounding like the burden (all burdens...) lie on the alimony payor, not only to prove what is going on, but to do the asking in the first place. The idea of a burden on the recipient to report her change in circumstances doesn't appear to amount to very much in practise. |
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bona fides
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Studieomgeving (BA): UL
Studieomgeving (MA): UL
Berichten: 22911
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| Geplaatst: wo 06 jul 2011 14:47 Onderwerp: |
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| cricketfan schreef: | | ... the question arises: is the payor in fact doomed to fail, because doing so (i.e. directly asking the question) would in most cases amount to a blatant tip-off that a detective investigation is likely to follow, giving the recipient and her partner ample time to cover their tracks and act in a manner optimised towards evading detectives/avoiding allowing them the quantity and/or nature of the evidence that's necessary. |
Well, you could try to argue that before the court when the alimony recipient submits it wasn't reasonable to hire a detective when a simple question would have sufficed.
| Quote: | | In a more straightforward criminal fraud case, would it be necessary to ask the suspected criminal if he or she has committed a crime before using detectives to obtain evidence, in order to ensure that damages for the necessary detective work could later on be succesfully obtained? |
The question is whether the costs were reasonable, and this obviously depends on the circumstances of the case. I just gave an example that you're free to disagree with.
Regarding LJN BK8009 I'm wondering whether claiming costs under art. 6:96 lid 2 sub b BW will be successful if there is an actual claim based on onverschuldigde betaling. Strictly speaking art. 6:96 lid 2 BW only kicks in when there is an obligation to pay schadevergoeding and onverschuldigde betaling (art. 6:203 BW) does not lead to such an obligation (whereas strangely enough ongerechtvaardige verrijking (art. 6:212 BW) would), but I wouldn't be surprised if art. 6:96 lid 2 BW applies by analogy to onverschuldigde betaling...
I'm not sure, but this could mean that the reasonable costs of hiring a detective bureau could be claimed back in most cases (since it would be sufficient that paid alimony can be reclaimed, i.e. there would not be a need to show an onrechtmatige daad).
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Hanc marginis exiguitas non caperet. |
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