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**Transnational Organized Crime**  
**-the concept and the case of God's own medicine-**

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**Curiosity is the key to personal development**

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## The aetiology

‘In the files that I consulted (...)I have never found that animal’. This was the answer that Fijnaut gave on the questions of the Van Traa Parliamentary Enquire Commission whether in the Netherlands could be spoken of Octopus kind organizations -hierarchic, close knit, structured organizations-. (Kleemans et.al. 1998; PEO, Appendix VIII, 1996, p.26)

In the European Union Organised Crime Report of 2003 can be read that the traditional hierarchic structure of organized crime is defied by new developed descriptions. These descriptions emphasize a more cellular structure, with loose accession, that on a normal social manner resists and are having a less clear command structure (Europol 2003). The presentation of organized crime solely as a hierarchic octopus kind organization is according to Fijnaut and Paoli (2004) a misrepresentation of an unpleasant Italian idea. That it is the question whether the image per definition is right was confirmed by Fijnauts answer on the questions of the Van Traa Parliamentary Enquire Commission mentioned above.

In an attempt to localize organized crime and the causes within criminological theory Ruggiero (1993) summarizes that (...)‘the interpretation of organized crime shows an extraordinary continuity in time. For over a century its aetiology has been based on categories such as: tradition and absence of the state (Lombroso); ‘cancer’, pathology and lack of control (Durkheim); the lower classes’ adaptation (Merton); disorganization and cultural deviance (Chicago School); learning processes involving selected individuals (Sutherland); and delinquent subculture (Cohen; Cloward and Ohlin). All these categories fall in different degrees, within a paradigm of deficit, whereby the causes of reside where a deficiency exists: be it one of control, of socialization, of opportunities or of rationality, and so on.’ By making his point Ruggiero states that all these categories of causes should be turned upside down in a ‘hypertrophy of opportunity’ and are less generated by deficit (Ruggiero 1993). The point made by Ruggiero is that organized crime and society are linked symbolically and exchange materially. The illegal world has a meaningful relation with the legal world (Ruggiero 1993).

Following the above described argument, the legal and the illegal world are inspired by each other and they profit from each other. The legal economy facilitates organized crime with financial services (financial trafficking and investments). Money laundering for example is acknowledged as the linkage between the legitimate and the illegal systems, as a crossroad between dirty money and legitimate money (Nelen 2003). The legal world provides the illegal world also with transport opportunities and the legal world on its turn can profit from -social- investments and so forth.

There also are negative influences of the illegal systems on the legal systems. For example money laundering can lead to the construction of economic power. Organized crime can even destabilise certain economic sectors (Nelen 2003). It can cause growing damage to society and can present a great threat to society (Fijnaut et.al. 1998). The society which is involved in a globalizing process.

Globalization is not a new process; it started in the sixteenth century (Zaitch 2004). It is a complex and multilayered concept and social phenomenon. Don Kalb claims it is a grand narrative of our time. In fact it is not more than a geographic fact: ‘people and places in the world become more densely and extensively connected to each other as a consequence of increasing transnational flows of capital/goods, information/ideas and people’ (Kalb 2000). Just as globalization serves well the needs of legal capital, so does it facilitate criminal enterprises (Passas 2002). The paradox which underlies this process is the following; while neo-liberal economics promotes market liberalization, a global drug criminalization regime promotes market prohibition. While the first tears down the influence of the state, the latter builds up the regulatory apparatus of the state and rolls the state forward (Andreas 1999).<sup>1</sup>

The importance of clear definitions and a clear insight of the causes of transnational organized crime is one of the main topics of this paper. I will also address the globalizing process, its influence and the link between illegal systems and legal systems. I will argue that the causes of transnational organized crime are not only deficiency. Moreover it is a synthesis of deficit and opportunity within the social context. That deficit and opportunity are both two points on one contextual circle. That they lay as far from each other as it can possible be, and at the same time lay as close to each other as one can imagine.<sup>2</sup> Because of this I will argue that a solely emphasize on deficit as the cause creates a martial policy and reaction. This response on organized crime adequately fails and makes a harsh subject of the matter which causes collateral damage. It has to be viewed integrative with other dimensions and disciplines because transnational organized crime is at the centre of the social context. The phenomenon has to be dealt with integrative in stead of pure by law enforcement.

This paper has two builing stones. The first center of gravity focusses on the concept of transnational organized crime. In the first section I will devote significant attention to the defining process of the term

<sup>1</sup> It goes beyond the reach of this paper to address this idea, of the epistemological dimension of control and states policy, any further. It is important though to keep this notion in the back of the mind because as we will later on see it is one of the constituting elements of the creation of the concept ‘transnational organized crime’.

<sup>2</sup> I follow the idea developed by Focqué and ‘t Hart (1990) who are using this concept for a law philosophical matter which also is present in this paper when I will address the instrumentalist and law protection function of law (see pp V).

transnational organized crime. I will further address the complexity of the denotative and connotative levels of definitions. I will introduce the term transnational organized crime and I will describe the underlying fundament and meaning of the definition. The second center of gravity is a case study. The second section describes 'a case of heroin' and addresses the influence of the process of globalization. This section hopes to give an answer on the following questions: Who is involved in heroine trafficking and how is the heroin trafficking organized? How do the notions of transnational organized crime apply to the case study? How are the links and interconnections between legality and illegality in the case study? The third section gives a conclusion and the fourth, last section outlines a few methodological questions rising up from this paper. So I try to get from the very abstract conceptualizing matter to more an overview of a concrete case study while highlighting the most important elements. This will lead at the end to the most concrete part while stressing the methodological follow up. By describing this I give an example of how a very concrete matter of the subject could be examined.

## I. Defining terms

In search for clarity numerous definitions have reached the further obfuscating sky.<sup>3</sup> Defining situations is a significant matter. The way something is defined not only determines the perception of it, but also shapes the policy (Fijnaut et.al.1998) and the size and presence of the phenomenon (Bovenkerk 2001). When defining for example organized crime, organized crime becomes what people label it (Von Lampe 2003). Some definitions of organized crime are too narrow (American Task Force on Organized Crime -1967- definition of close knit, hierarchical organizations of Italian origin) and some definitions are too broad (German Federal Criminal Office definition of organized crime). One problem which also arises here is the difficulty to determine how far the arm of the legal authorities can reach to tackle the defined problem (Fijnaut 1998 pp 23).

An important concept has to be addressed here to follow the argument as mentioned above. This is the concept of the 'democratic constitutional state'. With the birth of the classical democratic constitutional state a synthesis arose between the instrumental and the law protecting function. The law creates conditions for the individual right subject. It places human values in the centre of her protection. These conditions have two levels. The first level is protection against other people *within* the system (instrumental function); the second level is protection *against* the system (law protection function). These two functions should always be in balance. So in short the law is at the same time ground condition as well as precondition ('t Hart 2001).<sup>4</sup>

When a legal definition is too broad the instrumental function has ascendancy over the law protecting function. In other words the legal authority can go (too) far in making infringements in people's life. When the definition is too narrow the protection against other people will be at risk. This shows one of the important functions of a clear definition and also the danger of 'just' following legal definitions made by elites.

It is important to be aware of the complexity of definitions. They have a denotative (the formal definition of the term) and connotative meaning (an implied and less obvious predicate of the term) (Shepticky 2003). Words take their meaning in the context of other words and in the context of social practices.

This is underpinned by the statement of Michael Levi (2002) when addressing that 'the organization of crime depends on the historical stage of development and on the countermeasures to crime. The perpetrators of crimes find themselves in different contexts, depending on the city, country and their own embeddedness in concrete networks, criminal and elite'. Very often the world is not as black and white as is painted by analytical artificial descriptions and words. Moreover, prototypes are analytically separated by a broad tie in which the (social, political and economical) context plays a significant role (Jackendoff 1994, p180-183 and 198-202 in Koopmans 2003). When defining organized crime the departing point must be with regard to the social context in which organized crime is embedded.

A useful definition of organized crime which departs from this point of social embeddedness is the one given by Fijnaut et.al. 'groups primarily focused on illegal profits systematically commit crimes that adversely affect society and are capable of effectively shielding their activities, in particular by being willing to use physical violence or eliminate individuals by way of corruption' (Fijnaut et al. 1998). What does this mean for the concept of transnational organized crime?

Important when answering this question is the concept of globalization. Because at the source of transnational organized crime there are nationally, regionally and ethnically rooted organizations. These culturally based criminal organizations do not disappear in the new global networks, on the contrary the globalizing world allows these organisations to expand and survive by taking up with other networks (Castells 1998).

Fijnaut and Paoli (2004) consider the 1994 World Ministerial Conference as the official baptism of the term 'transnational organized crime'. Although and despite international attempts have been undertaken to define transnational organized crime, it 'remains vague and a ambiguous catchphrase, the application of which inevitably entails varying, but usually high, degrees of arbitrariness' (Fijnaut and Paoli 2004 ). According to Shepticky (2003): 'transnational crime is a constituent element in a complex linguistic authority structure that has

<sup>3</sup> For those interested there is a huge amount of definitions on Organized Crime on the web: [www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm](http://www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm)

<sup>4</sup> It goes beyond the reach of this paper to write this lawphilosophical argument any further.

both the connotative and denotative levels of meaning'. This has convincingly been showed by Andreas in the case of Mexico (Andreas 1999).

As an effect of the process of globalization market based reforms are introduced in many countries. Many drug-producing and exporting countries face powerful pressures to embrace both free-market reforms and drug market prohibition (Andreas 1999). As a result: a significant increase of the law enforcement apparatus, a classification of drugs as national threat and further reinforcing of the military anti-drug role declaring a war (Andreas 1999, Shepticky 2003).

So here we see that the interplay between the connotative and the denotative levels of meaning of the term 'transnational organized crime' produces images of an entity that is alien to normal society. As if it is a cancer that can be successfully exorcized from (a globalizing) society with martial acts and metaphors. These metaphors are particular powerful in a context which declares and creates acts 'deviant' or 'a threat' or 'a cancer' (Shepticky 2003) as is the case for developed globalizing countries, and for example developing countries as Mexico (Andreas 1999) and is the case for Afghanistan and Turkey, so will be argued in this paper (here I give my own arbitrary example: by dividing countries in developed- and developing countries which underpins the subjectivity and the surrounding connotatively meaning of annotative terms).

The concept of transnational organized crime is foremost understood in direct relation to other words among which are 'immigration' and 'drugs'. These terms surrounding transnational organized crime can make it a delicate and possible scapegoating issue which has to be handled with care. It has to be handled though because taboos in any science are taboo (Bovenkerk 2001). The kind of language surrounding transnational organized crime makes it sometimes an obstacle to really understand the phenomenon.

An important distinction is made by Passas by addressing the difference between organized crime and cross border crime. I will highlight this distinction below.

I let both the definitions of Fijnaut of 'organized crime' (1998) and Passas of 'cross border crime' (2002) collide into a definition for transnational organized crime. I further surround the definition of an epistemological dimension by addressing the denotative and connotative levels of definition. Here I am making use of the so called relational approach which places transnational organized crime at the centre in relation to her context and not as a side effect (Zaitch 2004). This is what Ruggiero (1993) mentioned when addressing that the legal and illegal systems are linked symbolically and materially together. First I will give the definition of transnational organized crime which I will use in this paper and second I will analyze this definition step by step.

*Transnational organized crime: 'an illegal declared process of production, processing or transportations of commodities systematically committed by groups primarily focused on illegal profits that adversely affect society and are capable of effectively shielding their activities, in particular by being willing to use physical violence or eliminate individuals by way of corruption, which jeopardizes the legally protected interests in more than one national jurisdiction and which is criminalized in at least one of the states/jurisdictions concerned'*

*an illegal declared process of production, processing and transportations of commodities:*

Here I introduce the epistemological dimension surrounding transnational organized crime which should be present in every definition of transnational organized crime. It is the dimension in which power and knowledge collide. Mostly the power and knowledge are by elite. Elite produce and construct the definitions. For example Afghanistan. For years the opium production has been used as a 'stick to slap' the country with. Although the stick to declare the war has been taken over by terrorism. Since Afghanistan embraces democratization, market reforms and other Western influences the opium is under control (so it seems to be according to the United States). In my opinion this can be an example for the epistemological dimension which I try to focus on. Because of this influence a term gets constructed and the term gets surrounded with dimensions the elite (or arbitrary definer) wants. In short: The process is declared illegal so it is made possible to intervene. If there will be an intervention is depending on declaring it a 'threat' or a 'cancer' or as a normal effect of the globalizing world.

*Groups that are primarily focused on illegal profits:*

When we take a close look at organizational structures we see distinctions made of organizations in: simple structures, machine bureaucratization, professional bureaucratization, division structures and the adhocracies (Mintzberg 1983, 2004).<sup>5</sup> I will make use of groups as seen as adhocracies. The main argument is the situational starting point of the definition used in this paper which starts from organized crime embedded in the social context. Adhocracies are embedded in a complex, dynamic and turbulent environment. Which I find in use for the adhocracies or criminal networks that as we shall see are hindered and facilitated by the social context (Kleemans et.al.1998). Further, based on Zaitch' study (2002) we see the use of functional units which are a key element of these organizations which also use subcontracting bringing different disciplines and skills together in

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<sup>5</sup> Again unfortunately it goes beyond the reach of this paper to further address to the specific organizations. By studying closely the organization forms we can see hierarchic ideas of criminal groups overlap with the bureaucratic organization forms which were common in the more Fordist era.

one network. This also corresponds with Zaitch' (2002) research where he addresses 'the mutating interconnections of small units which permanently change in the context'. We also see selective decentralizations (cliques and central positions are possible –Fijnaut 1998-), mutual adaptation which corresponds with the points made by Zaitch (2002) and we see a combined functional focus and profit-focused group.

These profits are based upon the distinction by motivation. Passas (2002) makes a distinction between enterprise crime (crimes for profit), political crime and hybrid crime. In this paper I include hybrid crime and crime for profits. Here I follow the arguments of the Fijnaut definition which excludes politically-inspired crimes. Hybrid crime is included when a primary focus on profit can be argued while analyzing a network.

*That systematically commits crimes that adversely affect society*

According to Fijnaut (1998) this component is included to emphasize the fact that crimes can be committed against persons, markets and society as a whole. A bit fuzzy is here the fact that society can be endangered but can also profit from crime. This is an arbitrary fact which has to be signalled subjectively in combination with the other elements in the definition. By including the constituent 'systematically' the definition emphasize the element of continuity.

*That is capable of effectively shielding their activities:*

Here the point is made by Fijnaut (1998) that it is important to look at external and internal threats. When a criminal group is threatened both externally and internally, one is willing and able to use drastic methods to shield their activities, including violence, corruption or other forms of intimidation and so forth which present a great threat to the constitutional state. This also looks at the point that organized crime can interweave with society in antithetical and symbiotic relationships

Passas (2002) describes the relations between underworld and upper world as *antithetical* and *symbiotic*. Furthermore the legal-illegal links are not always known, suspect or direct (there may be degrees of directness of this link). First I will describe what Passas means by antithetical relationships and second I will address the symbiotic relationships between legal and illegal worlds.

*Antithetical* relationships: We speak of 'antagonistic relationships' when there is competition between legal and illegal actors (illegal gambling, crooked financial services on the internet); We call relationships 'predatory' when the aim is to destroy or bleed to death an organization (fraudulent bankruptcy, cop killings, terrorism); The 'parasitical' relationship is described by the aim to preserve the viability of the target, make use of it or infiltrate it (rackets, use of containers or mail service, contra-intelligence).

*Symbiotic* relationships. There is 'outsourcing' when there is division of labour, specialized service provided by subcontracting (contracted killings, waste disposal, early stage money laundering, financial loans, legal defence); We speak of 'collaboration' when links become stronger and legal and illegal actors work together (military/drug traffickers, art theft, accountancy); There is 'Co-optation' when there is exchange between uneven partners -power-(companies spying for states in exchange for business opportunities). There is a relationship of 'reciprocity' when there is even exchange through mutual benefit (brothel / women trade, buyers / sellers of illegal goods and services, politicians / transnational corporations); Synergy arises when there is independent promoting of the other (final stage money laundering, waste disposal, tobacco smuggling, banking secrecy, money transfers); Also possible are 'funding' relations. Sometimes legal actors become illegal entrepreneurs (no interface), thus Organized Crime can also be acted by legal actors-(BCCI, Enron, Noriega, Menem, Gil y Gil, Eastern German authorities, CIA). The term 'recon version' is used when illegal entrepreneurs are becoming / interacting with legal actors (some Cali drug traffickers, 'contributions', social investments).<sup>6</sup>

*which jeopardizes the legally protected interests in more than one national jurisdiction and which is criminalized in at least one of the states/jurisdictions concerned:*

By defining transnational organized crime further distinction has to be made between international and cross-border crime. The first is legally defined as follows: crimes committed, but prohibited by international law. The latter is defined as: crimes which violate the laws of more than one country. Passas (2002) gives a more abstract and principle definition of cross-border crime which also includes legal norms: 'cross border crime is conduct, which jeopardizes the legally protected interests in more than one national jurisdiction and which is criminalized in at least one of the states/jurisdictions concerned'. The process of globalization has contributed to the growth of this phenomenon as we shall see by the description of the case of heroin.

In the following section (Section II) I will use the above mentioned definition of transnational organized crime. I will do so by describing the case of God's own medicine, the case of opium production, processing of opium into heroin, and the transportation of heroin.

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<sup>6</sup> The examples have been captured from D. Zaitch' lectures (2004)

## **II. The case of God's own medicine: A Case of Heroin**

In 800 before Christ Homer already wrote about Opium when he described the city Mekone (Papaver City), at that time nearby the city of Corinth.<sup>7</sup> This means that opium papaver was grown in the region and probably became used as a medicine and source of euphoria. Opium in Asia has been described through the ages as the medicine of God. And as a medicine it is nowadays still used as a solution for more than 700 problems (Asad and Harris 2003) Although the origin and the antiquity of this opium papaver plant remains uncertain, certain though is that opium papaver is the basis for morphine and heroin. In the following sections the case of heroin will be described. First I will address the process of globalization which has an important influence on transnational organized crime.

### **II.I The influence of the globalizing process and the rise of the network society**

As we already noticed in the case of Mexico (Andreas 1999) market based reforms are introduced as an effect of the process of globalization. These reforms include deregulation, privatization and trade liberalization (Andreas 1999). Free market reforms can unintentionally increase, facilitate and encourage legal and also illegal activity. In the following section I will try to analyse the influence of globalization on society in general. I will furthermore apply it to the case of Heroin. Although I separate the flows in: the flow of information/ideas; the flow of persons; and the flow of goods and capital, one must keep in mind that here the flows are artificially and abstractly separated, but are in concrete interacting.<sup>8</sup>

Castells (1996 and 2000) shows the rise of the network society in which internationalizations of criminal activities closely follows the characteristics and organizational logic of the network enterprise (Castells 1998; 2000). For corporations the 'main shift can be characterized as the shift from vertical bureaucracies to the horizontal corporation' (Castells 1996). As a result of globalization many migratory flows followed. Migratory flows and migrants' behaviour should be understood as complex forms of social network building (Kalb 2000). These 'new' social and organizational arrangements are all based on networks and can have a cross border structure. Every period of organizational transformation has its archetypical expression. Ford Motor Company became the symbol of the industrialized era (Castells 1996,) but now the 'globalized networked model' is taking over. Information (according to Castells 'the' material of the globalising society –Burgers 2005-) circulates through these business networks and we can say the same about social networks which communicate and structure each others motivations, chances and options (Kalb 2000). Zaitch shows with his research among Colombian traquetos the comparisons between Post Fordist and Cocaine business. The way in which Colombian traquetos organise themselves seems to fit the flexible organisational structures of the post-Fordist era and system of globalizing networks (Zaitch 2002, Table IX).

Social networks are described by Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004). The types of these social networks can be distinguished in chain networks and hierarchic central networks. The chain networks are characterized by little social relations between persons and the contact between actors in the network is rarely direct, but is shady and goes mostly via others in the network.

Hierarchic structures can be found in the world affairs and also in the bureaucratic authorities and organizations. This is when a particular clique takes a central, leading position in the network. Then it is considered a hierarchic network. Most networks miss these hierarchic features from a pyramid structure. This does not mean that there are no hierarchic relations or – with a better word –dependent relations. Within the social networks men have different forms of appearances. These dependences on their positions in the network, as well as that position can vary from a marginal to a central position.

Societies are becoming dualized with a substantial top and a substantial bottom growing at both ends of the occupational social structure. The social structures are based on a declining middle idea (Sassen 2002). Although the decline in the middle depends upon the position of each country in the international division of labour and on its political climate (Castells 1996). Important hereby is the 'global city' thesis of Saskia Sassen (2002). Here she places both the economic development and polarization in one theory (Burgers 2005).

As mentioned above the crime networks need skilled professionals and subcontractors and also a large number of unskilled employees (Ruggiero 1993, Zaitch 2002). The illegality of the markets in with the drug traffickers operate 'intensify the developments; they seem to touch the core of the developments of current capital and labour markets under disorganized capitalism; it introduces even more dynamism to post Fordist trends' (Zaitch 2002). This cumulates into an intersystem of small, changing and temporary coalitions.

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<sup>7</sup> However an ongoing scientific discussion takes place on archaeological matters when this mysterious poet should have lived.

<sup>8</sup> This process of interaction between all kinds of elements makes this paper complex but it also tries to make this paper be as precise as possible (despite the fact that because of the addressed complexity it seems one can never be precise but one can try to reach as close to the truth as possible. Truth is the utopia. A utopia is an imaginary description which ultimately should be reached after following a certain path but is never going to be reached. This seems to fit the whole idea of science in which the reach for the truth is the central and main aim and a theory stands till another theory seems to reach the truth better.)

These intersystem or networks have or are characterized by an important and central type. Between the networks and persons, there are the so-called brokers or bridge-builders or mediators functions (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004, Zaitch 2002, Van de Bunt et al. 2002). The brokers connect potential producers, buyers and sellers, employees and employers and so forth (Zaitch 2002). The brokers lay the contacts between the different networks. Brokers are active in both networks and are equipped with key skills. They can, for instance, launder dirty money or falsify documents.

Also important are subcontractors and facilitators. These service providers can provide their service in two ways and can fulfil the most flexible kinds of positions for criminal collaborations. They can in the first place be called in for a specific front line activity. Through the switch to service providers for 'dirty jobs' they can keep their hands clean (these are the major important unskilled subcontractors -Ruggiero 1993; Zaitch 2002-). In the second place service providers can come on the set because they have a specific expertise that the collaboration needs (skilled subcontractors and professionals who can be legitimate actors - Zaitch 2002-).

An important aspect in the case of criminal networks is the bonding mechanisms. Because of the illicit nature of the product different bonding systems can work together: 1) Bonding by social relations: Perpetrators often know each other already longer and know that they can meet each other in the future again; 2) Bonding by economic advantage; the illegal practices can be profitable for all concerned; 3) Bonding by violence and intimidation. Actual violence, or sometimes the threat of violence and intimidation (for instance through means of having violent reputation and threatening persons in the surroundings can effectively bond persons -Kleemans et al. 1998; Zaitch 2002; Levi 2003; Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz 1998-).

The effect of globalization multiplies, intensifies and activates criminogenic asymmetries and it facilitates jurisdiction shopping (Passas 2002, Andreas 1999). Passas defines the criminogenic asymmetries as 'structural disjunctions, mismatches and inequalities in the spheres of politics, the economy and the law. Asymmetries are criminogenic in that they generate or strengthen the demand for illegal goods and services (more opportunities); they generate incentives for particular actors to participate in illegal transactions (more motives); and they reduce the ability of authorities to control illegal activities (less control) (Passas 2002; Zaitch 2004)'.

In my opinion these asymmetries have to be explained in their local embeddedness. Very important for understanding this way of thinking is the concept of 'glocalization': local appropriations of global items and opportunities that either affiliate with the global trends or take some distance from them. It is mostly a combination of the two, the outcome is dependant on local social histories, the insertion in wider networks of exchange and social relationships of power, advantage and backwardness on various levels (Robertson 1992 in Kalb 2000). The important notion with this is that, although many definitions speak of transnational organized crime, it is not solely globally or transnational experienced. Crucial phases, such as production and processing, wholesale and retail distribution and final consumption, take place locally (Fijnaut and Paoli 2004). So with highlighting the term glocalization. I want to avoid that the crimes will be seen as abstracts, in stead of crimes within their originating political, economic and social context. Within this context the crimes might be better understood or explained and dealt with by law enforcement (see also Margaret Beare, 2003 in Fijnaut en Paoli 2004 pp39).

One final remark I want to make here is the following: Passas (2002) addresses the point that globalization multiplies, intensifies and activates 'criminogenic asymmetries'. When he describes the term 'asymmetries' he connects it with terms such as 'structural disjunctions', 'mismatches' and 'inequalities'. So the denotative 'criminogenic asymmetries' is surrounded by negative connotative meaning. By placing more words between the hedges Zaitch (2004) seems to be aware of both the negative and the positive side of the term. As I argued before, I here argue again that it should be surrounded by a deficit, as well as an opportunity connotative meaning and terms. In stead of the term asymmetries I prefer the more neutral term environment. If it is not explained in this way it only looks at one side and this enhances transnational organized crime with a negative connotative meaning. Which is one side of the medal, or one point on the circle.

Above I described the influence of the globalization process on society and on transnational organized crime. In the following section I will describe the case of God's own medicine: opium and heroin. As already mentioned the globalizing process is not more than a geographic fact: 'people and places in the world become more densely and extensively connected to each other as a consequence of increasing transnational flows of capital/goods, information/ideas and people'(Kalb 2000). To make it more accessible, I started with a general description of the rise of the network society, the importance of networks and the impact on transnational organized crime. Now I shall make an analytic distinction between the flow of information and ideas, the flow of people and the flow of goods and capital. Important though is that these flows interact.

## **II.II The flow of information and Ideas.**

Because of the increased flow of information a growing number of space and places are becoming cognitively in reach of lots of people (Burgers 1999). In a network society where communication is getting faster (compare for example the Polish Peasant letters described by Thomas and Znaniecki -1996- with the use of communication

means as the internet nowadays) it enables networks to circulate information (Castells 1996,2000). Immigrants remain materially, culturally and politically connected to their home country (Bovenkerk 2001) thus they remain from a distance locally embedded. In this way migratory flows can be best understood as complex forms of social network building (Kalb 2000).

### II.III The flow of people (immigrants).

Migration is one of the best examples of the globalizing network society. Here every aspect of globalization fits. Through the economic restructuring of production processes, a connection is given birth which has a multiplier effect and results in polarization of the social structure (Sassen 2002). According to Saskia Sassen (2002) migration follows definable lines of specific connections between countries and regions. Capital investments, colonial ties, war and, for example, the above described flow of information. This shows that not only the poorest people in the most deficit countries migrate, but also the wealthier (Burgers 1999). Migration is not just a product of asymmetries and deficit (just poor-rich migration); it is also caused by opportunities. The process of globalization intensifies it all (Zaitch 2002, Passas 2002).<sup>9</sup>

Today's urbanized and industrialized countries have been a host to lots of immigrants. Also immigrants with a social background that leads back to places where organized crime was embedded. This should be clear, because organized crime is a normal phenomenon of society. In part organized crime has come in with the migrants (Bovenkerk 2001). An important indicator for the social embeddedness of organized criminality forms the Turkish organized crime. This flourished after large numbers of Turkish migrants self had established themselves in the Netherlands (Bruinsma 2004) (: see for the estimated amount of Turkish immigrants Table 1 in the appendix).

Table 1. Estimated amount of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, 1990-2000

Year	Estimated amount
1990	100,000
1995	150,000
2000	200,000

Source: Bruinsma (2004), p. 10. The numbers are based on the data of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and the Turkish Ministry of Migration.


Passing the geographical distance is not the most problematic for transnational organized crime. More important are the social relations which have to be present in other countries. Information/ideas and people pass distances easier when they are connected to a network. A network on which they are able to focus and which can help them locally (Bruinsma 2004).

Social networks do not arise arbitrary but follow mostly the laws of the social and geographical process (Kleemans et.al. 1998). In the next paragraph I will describe the flow of goods and capital where transnational ties such as family ties or ethnicity ties, in for example the logistic sector, play significant roles.

### II.IV The flow of goods and capital.

#### De Golden Sickle/Croissant and the Golden Triangel (production area)

Nowadays the production of opium papaver mainly takes place in three Asian countries. The countries are Myanmar, Laos and Afghanistan (UNODC World Drug Report 2004, Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004). These three countries are responsible for 90% of the world production of opium papaver. (Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate: see appendix).



Opium papaver can be produced in 'many' countries (one for example has knowledge of production of opium papaver in Egypt, Peru, Thailand, Central Asia and in the Caucasus region) but it does not mean that it is everywhere possible, nor that the quality is everywhere the same. 'Many' is therefore scientifically an empty term. This is why further specification is necessary. By being more specific we can see the contours of the social embeddedness of Transnational Organized Crime.

Opium is a drought resistant crop needing little irrigation and offering the highest yield in the cold temperatures of the mountain regions (Asad and Harris 2003). For the cultivation of opium papaver skills and experience are necessarily and very important because it is labour-intensive. Its soil and climate conditions are

<sup>9</sup> It can be both deficit and opportunities to address one of the main points of this paper again. Indeed it is not solely a deficit migration, it is a network/bonding migration based upon opportunities.

also very crucial (UNODC World Drug Report 2004). These conditions have to be present for both a good quality and quantity yield of opium papaver.

Furthermore the production of opium (in general) finds place in difficult to access border areas (Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz 1998) with mountain ranges, or plains without adequate transport connection and infrastructure; at regions in which the state authority is not effectively practiced and local rulers are in power. Here smuggling traditions have been developed (Bovenkerk 2001).

If we look at the social economic dependency, the UNODC (2004) estimates that 264,000 families cultivate opium poppy. We must consider that an Afghan family includes 6-7 people. So if we do our math we come to an average of 1.7 million people whose livelihood depend on the cultivation of opium poppy. That is about 7 % of the total population of Afghanistan. Another important notice is the relatively high financial yield. The yield of opium poppy cultivation is 2.5 times higher than the average national income per head. Therefore we must not neglect the fact that it is absolutely profitable to cultivate opium poppy.

In October 2003, UNODC and the Afghan government conducted a farmers' intentions survey that revealed that almost 70% of the farmers interviewed in the opium growing regions of Afghanistan intended to increase poppy cultivation in 2004, while only 4% considered reducing it.

## The routes

*Opium produced in Turkey, India and Iran is processed into heroin in Lebanon, France and Italy and prepared for shipment to the East Coast of the United States of America (Preble and Casey 1969)*

For the Netherlands, the source of most of the heroin is the Golden Sickle/Croissant region (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004). In the upcoming paragraph I will illustrate and describe the different routes. First I will describe how heroin, and then rough opium, from the earlier described production, is brought to the departure points of the routes. Then I will describe which routes the heroin transport follows by addressing the two largest routes: the 'Balkan Route' and the 'Silk Route'.

A very important remark must be placed by the presentation of the trafficking routes. Reuter (1983) already argued -in his in the meanwhile classical work- that the illegalities of the product influence the manner of procession and distribution. Criminal networks have to act with the handicap of illegality. In the case of the trafficking routes we can see indeed that these are very flexible and are changing every time as a consequence of the handicap of the illegal commodity. The influence of counter measurements and reaction of perpetrators makes that these routes change from time to time. Organized crime groups see themselves forced to be flexible and the merchant seeks constantly to the best route.

This is underpinned by Chouvy et.al. by stating that 'the routes are negotiable, thousands of kilometres of roads, intersected by hundreds of checkpoint give the trafficker absolute security at derisory costs far outweighed by the benefits. The trafficker, as a clever entrepreneur, will invest initial profits first and foremost in local people and organizations' (Chouvy et.al. 2003). So the routes are flexible. Paoli affirms the flexible disorganization thesis of Reuter on the basis of her investigation on the drugs trade in Russia (see Paoli 2001).

From Afghanistan many paths can be taken, but in general two routes can be described: Via the south, Iran and Turkey and the Balkans; and via the north, via central Asia to Eastern Europe via Russia, and then the Ukraine (Chouvy et.al. 2003). The main routes, however, remain the Balkan routes and these mainly take place over land. Although an important route has its way over sea via Turkey, the Mediterranean Sea region to Italy or Spain and further to the United Kingdom or even United States and Canada. Another possibility is the transportation of heroin by airplane. Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz (1998) state that some Africans were signalled flying between countries as a courier. A small amount comes by train.

**The Balkan route.** From the mountains of Afghanistan (16,404.20 feet) the opium is smuggled with camels, mules and horses over camel trails and mountain paths (Chouvy et.al. 2003), most frequently blocked physical (passes, deep valleys), political (frontiers) and geopolitical (internal and external conflicts) to opium laboratories and thereafter transported to Northern Pakistan, to the other northern countries (Chouvy et.al. 2003.; Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz 1998).

Further west the route becomes more visible and more substantial. From here it proceeds by car, mule and horse and is transported to Iran and the east of Turkey. This is carried out mainly by Afghans: farmers; brokers -this very important player in networks has already been addressed. They make contact with separate persons and also deliverer services such as money laundering. The brokers are often the key actors of networks (Zaitch 2002) -; opium boilers -the vast majority of laboratories are in general found in Afghanistan and Turkey, along the routes. Their knowledge is specialized and is mostly inherited from father to son. (Chouvy et.al. 2003; Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz 1998)-; exporters. Involved are also Kurds and Iranians.

Another unit takes over and brings the heroin and opium by car, airplane or helicopter to Istanbul or a coast place at the Mediterranean See. This second step is taken care of mostly by Turks and Kurds.

A third unit brings the heroin or opium by bus, car, ship or truck to the countries of destiny. This is carried out mostly by Turks, Laze and Kurds (Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz 1998) (: see figure 2.1 and 2.2 in the appendix for the routes mapped).



Through Iran, the cargo heads to Istanbul, and the seaside cities of Turkey. This with the help of Kurdish groups (Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz 1998). It goes mostly from Turkey, via Bulgaria and Romania, through former Yugoslavia, Hungary, Slovakia, sometimes the Czech republic and through Austria and Germany. However, many alternatives are possible, for instance more to the south, via former Yugoslavia and Albania, to Slovenia or Italy and then further to the west (Chouvy et.al. 2003) (: see appendix figure 3 for the routes mapped).



**The Silk Route.** As a consequence of the implosion of the Soviet Union the border has opened between Afghanistan and her neighbouring countries Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Via one of these countries, the route leads further through Kazakhstan and Russia. Via the Ukraine, the heroine can go further through Poland, Germany and yet further to the west, the United Kingdom over country or over sea via Belgium or the Netherlands (Chouvy et.al. 2003). Also via the Balkans and Hungary or via the Baltic states and Scandinavia, heroin will penetrate the Western European market (: see appendix figure 4 for the routes mapped).



When the drugs arrive in the countries of destination the distribution begins. Here another small organisation takes care of the business. Street distributors, including Moroccans, Surnames, Irakees, Dutch will take care of the local selling.

In the following section I will describe two flows which go vice versa. The flow of *acetic anhydride* and the flow of capital.

### **Balkan retour**

Here two aspects of the flow vice versa will be addressed. The first which I will address shortly is the flow backwards of chemical precursors, primarily *acetic anhydride*. This product is needed to transform the raw opium into chemical derivatives. I already addressed that the opium laboratories are in general situated in Turkey and Afghanistan. These countries do not produce *acetic anhydride*, so this has to be imported which creates a flow backwards.

The bulk of criminal proceedings is by definition globalized. Through money laundering via global financial markets (Castells 1998). This flow of capital is the second flow which I will address more intensively because of its importance. Although the term money laundering is relatively new, its practice is not. In Hammurabi's Babylonia the first genuine tax code 'stimulated the imagination of those who sought to grant themselves a rebate' (Naylor 2002).

In the 1920s Chicago, one financier from local gangsters, tried to hide his success with a basic strategy of taking-over cash, based on retail service business. The most popular choices were laundries and car washes. So dirty money could become laundered money (Naylor 2002; Castells 1998).

Money laundering is a three stage process: disassociating (moving funds from direct association with the crime); obfuscation (disguising the trail to foil pursuit); legitimization (making the funds again available to the instigator- Castells (1998). It also sums up three stages, he calls the second stage 'layering' and the latter the stage of integration. It seems to me these are the same stages only differently labelled-. Most of the times all three stages are combined; these principle remain the core of most strategies to-day.

The service sector seems the best sector of both for evading taxes and laundering money. Again the economic transformations are used in advance because the service sector is the one increasing sharply. Examples of the ideal environment (here I use 'environment' instead of 'asymmetry') are given by Naylor (2002); car washes, restaurants, used car dealers, video rental shops, bars. In this way all the stages can be effectively fulfilled in one milieu: By physically running cash through the business money gets disassociated; by reporting the money as earning of the business the trail gets obfuscated; and after the business' tax returns have been approved, the money can openly be used legitimately and integrated.

When sums become larger; an organization hooks up internationally; and/or the counter measurements, with regard to transnational organized crime, become heavier, the laundering process will take a higher level (the international dimension). Here the three stages become chronologically and logically distinct (Naylor 2002).

The international cycles begin with disassociation (moving the funds out of the country of origin). Mostly helped by the migration flows, where ethnic and religious minorities get embedded in Western society, transactions take place across borders within an extended family or ethnic network. Underground banking systems reflect the extent of emigration (Naylor 2002).

According to Naylor (2002) there seems little doubt that most funds go out to foreign havens in cash. Movements take place over land, by boat (in containers, private cabins), airplane (by couriers such as low profile rabbi's, priests, diplomats or by professionals and so on).

A classic method is to structure the transaction. The money is broken up into a series of deposits each under the reporting threshold. Zaitch (2002) describes how it works for Colombian *traquetos* to send money to Colombia: 'Uneven amounts of € 2,500 to € 3,500 were distributed amongst 6 different people, who would deposit it in well known funds transfer offices avoiding sending the same people very often. In this way an amount of US\$ 90,000 each time could be sent to different accounts'.

Once it is abroad it can be plunked into an accommodating bank and the matter is at an end (Naylor 2002). For our case: Via Pakistan there is a huge black market in German Franks and U.S. dollars. Drug traffickers often make use of this market, mostly via cash or via a firm. These firms are mostly fruit or electronics import and export organizations. This is a beautiful example of the symbiotic relationship between the illegal and the legal world. Also the refugees from Afghanistan living in the Western European world give lots of opportunities as described above (Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz 1998). This is a beautiful example of the process of globalization facilitating organized crime, placing organized crime in her social context and showing the relationship between the legal and illegal systems.

## II.V Summarizing

In most opium poppy cultivation areas the soil is limited and the land cannot be improved much or further cultivated. Very important are the strategical and geographical positions of the land. The areas must not be visible and accessible for the law enforcement because any illegal activity will be easily detected. The climate element is also crucial. Opium is a drought resistant crop. Due to many geographical and climatological elements opium poppy cultivation might be the only profitable and economically attractive form of cultivation. Here the deficit and opportunities collide.

Very important in the argument made in this paper is the synthesis of both deficit and opportunity. They can be seen as two points on a circle where they can be as far from each other as one can imagine, but, on the other hand, also very close to each other. They seem to call on each other. Where deficit arises opportunities (illegal/legal) arise and where opportunity arise so does deficit.

Before the Afghan opium hits the heart of Europe many kilometres must be passed. For the connection between Asia and Europe the trade route through the Balkans is (also historically seen) of vital interest. Millions of trucks, passenger cars, buses and so on make use of these routes. Traffickers of heroin do not invent the routes themselves; they take advantage of these axes of commerce and trade. Since the seventies the heroin comes, from the golden sickle, via the Balkan route, to Western Europe.

There is much overlap between the Balkans Route and the Silk Route. There is also much overlap between the route of illegal products and legal products. In a world ruled by market forces often no difference is made between legal and illegal and a vital intersection is made with the legal routes of business. One perfect symbiotic relation between the legal and illegal systems becomes visible here.

With Turkey as gate of and to Europe and many years of knowledge of the processing of opium into heroin, the most important ethnicities of heroin merchants are the Turkish and Kurdish. The strategic geographical location and the historically grown chemical knowledge of the laboratories are used. Further use is made of the transport of legal trade in commodities that passes and travelling persons between Turkey and the Western countries. With Turkish communities arising after the long period of recruitment of immigrant workers in the sixties and seventies another interweave becomes visible between the legal and illegal world.

For so much, bridging the geographical distance does not play a significant role for the organized crime. It is the presence of social relations and connections in other countries that is important. People pass geographical spaces faster when there is someone connected to the network, to which one can direct himself on the spot and that can help him. These human relations and connections are the building stones of the social network theory.

For the more cellular network approach (as adhocracies) of criminality, as well as for the definition of transnational organized crime, the accent lies on organized criminality as social phenomenon. Social networks do not arise arbitrary, but follow mostly the laws of the social and geographical process.

In short: The networks are not as a whole closed ethnic homogeneous or only closed ethnic networks (Kleemans et.al. 1998). When we focus locally on the process we can depart, for example, with the Afghan farmer. Further on we see Iranians, Kurds and Turks, Western Europeans and Africans. Examples of the

involvement of other ethnicities are: the interception of one transport where other nationalities were used, because the risk for Turkish drivers became too high, or the flying Africans, or the street distributors.

Because of the geographical distance the networks are large. For transnational organized crime passing of the geographical distance is not the most problematic. More important are the social relations which have to be present in other countries. Information/ideas and people pass distances easier when they are connected to a network. A network on which they are able to focus and which can help them locally.


Because the Turkish migrants live permanently in Dutch cities, transnational contacts are available. It is possible to maintain the contacts easily. As an important element, next to the geographical factors, we see that social factors are very important to. Because of the multi complexity of the whole trade, many social contacts are needed. Important are the social relations instead of a sole emphasize on ethnicity. With other words connections which have to be present. So there is a social embeddedness which sometimes hinders, but also facilitates transnational organized crime.

Because of the social embeddedness, the dynamic social context, the fluid social connections, the subcontracting, the use of violence, intimidation and threat and also the functional focus it is better to think in terms of adhocracies in stead of hierarchical pyramids.

### III Illustrating and concluding

This section wants to give an answer to the following questions: **Who is involved in heroine trafficking and how is the heroin trafficking organized?**

When we want to illustrate the case of heroin as described above we can bring it all together in the upcoming schematic image. Remark: the fact that surrounding the different numbers there can be other persons involved which can range from one person or more. With inter-personal relationships just as in every day social life or also by using the described bonding mechanisms.



- 1) Afghan farmer (skilled subcontractors)
- 2) Afghan brokers
- 3) Afghan opium boiler (skilled subcontractors)
- 4) Merchants/traffickers (most Kurds and Iranians) unit 1 (unskilled subcontractors): using mules, camels, horses, cars.
- 5) Kurds, Turks: unit 2 (most unskilled subcontractors): using cars, airplanes, helicopters.
- 6) Central Turkish broker
- 7) Merchants/traffickers (unskilled subcontractors most Turkish, Kurds and Laze sometimes professional -western European- truckers or Africans mostly flying as couriers, and so forth) using buses, cars, ships, trains or trucks
- 8) Local organization/contact broker (most ethnic Turks in different Western Europe countries)
- 9) Underground bankers (-un-skilled and skilled subcontractors)
- 10) Street distributors 'Locals' Moroccans, Surnames, Irakees, Dutch
- 11) Money launderers (disassociating) using structured transactions
- 12) Money launderers (disassociating) using ethnic banks, bars, garages, coffeehouses, travel agents, fruit- and electronics import and export business

- 13) Black market money launderer in Pakistan
- 14) Flow of *acetic anhydride* goes to the laboratories

I have described the significant matter of defining terms. I have carefully tried to build a definition of transnational organized crime which includes an epistemological dimension, an organized crime dimension, and a cross border dimension. The departing point of the definition is the social embeddedness of the phenomenon. It also addresses attention to the term 'glocalization'.

Transnational organized crime in this paper is defined as: *'an illegal declared process of production, processing or transportations of commodities systematically committed by groups primarily focused on illegal profits that adversely affect society and are capable of effectively shielding their activities, in particular by being willing to use physical violence or eliminate individuals by way of corruption, which jeopardizes the legally protected interests in more than one national jurisdiction and which is criminalized in at least one of the states/jurisdictions concerned'*

#### **How does the notion of transnational organized crime apply to the case study?**

The production of opium, the processing into heroin and the transportation of heroin are globally declared illegal and opium and heroin are globally prohibited. I argued that the groups involved with heroin trafficking fulfil the elements of the in the definition described adhocracies. The focus and motivation on illegal profits is implicitly present (for example by the description of the many ways of money laundering), but may be not convincing, because the primarily focus on illegal profit is implicit but not convincible showed in this paper. Further research is necessary. In the next section I will for example describe a methodological follow up. Here I try to work out a research topic. The use of violence, intimidation, threat and bribery is present in the literature and in this case. Violence and intimidation are, for example, bonding mechanism and use of bribery was for example the case by the trafficking routes. Because of the large networks, the passing through many countries and the involvement of different nationalities in this type of crime is at least in The Netherlands criminalized according to art. 140 of the Dutch legal code. Even acts that try to bring the illegal commodity into the Netherlands are criminalized (art. 13 Dutch Opium Law and jurisprudence and Koopmans 2003).

#### **How are the links and interconnections between legality and illegality in the case study?**

The relation between transnational organized crime and the society can vary. We can place them on a continuum of antithetical and symbiotically relationship with levels and degrees in directness. The conclusion of the investigation group Fijnaut was that there is no strong symbiosis between organized criminality and the economy or the politics. This was also emphasised by Kleemans et.al. and this is also underlined in this paper. We see sometimes antithetical and sometimes symbiotically relationships. By *Antithetical* we can think of, for example, the 'parasitical' relationship where one uses truck drivers of other nationality, other car drivers to transport the heroin, or the use of containers, or by suppressing own ethnic businessman. By *Symbiotic* we can think of, for example, what we saw in the case of money laundering, service providers by subcontracting and financial loans, agency and state support of illegal trafficking.

As a general conclusion on the relationship between the illegal and the legal world: the environment both hinders and facilitates transnational organized crime because it is embedded in society which is the context. Further research has to be done to make this understood better.

#### **Final remarks on policy**

I want to end by arguing that transnational organized crime in the case of drug trafficking within the social context is not only caused by a paradigm of deficit, but that it is also caused by opportunity. The case was described with regard to the process of globalization which intensifies the deficit and opportunity of transnational organized crime. We saw in the case of Afghanistan the synthesis of deficit and opportunity which caused a lack of control and which caused a motivation and vast possibilities to produce and continue to produce opium papaver. The synthesis of this caused a good quality and quantity yield of the Afghan fields.

Heroin trafficking is well embedded in the legal flows of people, goods/capital and ideas/information. Here also the synthesis exists between deficit and opportunity. The West European cities are a host for ethnic minorities with whom organized crime often comes along. Because of the communication possibilities, a strong connection remains between migrants and the former community. Along with the already existing axis and routes of commerce and trade, legal and illegal goods and capital come and go vice versa. Networks exist. It could be seen as an effect of a globalizing networking society, stronger formulated as a form of glocalizing which is embedded in the multi complex developments and interactions of media, state, economy and society and so forth.

Here I argue that it is a contextual synthesis of both deficit and unfettered production, a case of both hindering and facilitating of the social context. Organized crime thereby could be interpreted as an outcome of unfettered production, also generated by a deficit and a hypertrophy of opportunities.

Because of the argued epistemological dimension and denotative and negative connotative interaction the emphasis on transnational organized crime is based on an 'alien' 'national threat' approach. This has to be defeated by martial acts and law, because it is a cancer that has to be exorcized. As a consequence it builds up the regulatory apparatus of the state and rolls the state forward. This epistemological dimension is focused only on control and repression. This response on organized crime adequately fails and makes a harsh subject of the matter which causes collateral damage.

In my opinion and based on my arguments the synthesis of deficit and opportunity shows that transnational organized crime is a social product which has many components. A too shorted emphasize on deficit creates a wrong rational to increase the role of the states by declaring it only a martial and law enforcement matter. The policy against transnational organized crime should be based on the synthesis described in this paper which is intensified by the global process. Because transnational organized crime is at the centre of the social context. The policy will than be one that integrates varying dimensions of policy, including external affairs, economics and must absolutely have social components such as social and economic development and water and food programmes.

#### **IV. Methodological follow up**

In this section I will describe how a research on heroin trafficking should look like. Specially a research in which I would want to investigate the relation between the illegal and legal world as a primary focus. My aim is to describe the qualitative research methods that I would prefer to use in this kind of research.

My research question would be:

What is the motivation of the actors in the heroin adhocracies?

Motivation: is the primary focus that can be distinguished in an economic profit, a political target or a hybrid aim? All the concerned persons, that we can bring in connection with the heroin network, are meant here as actors. Heroin adhocracies are illustrated and already described in this paper.

With the next sub questions: How does one get involved in the trade? What was the position of the persons within the network? How can we describe /What were the bonding mechanisms within the network? With whom and with how many contact points in a network does a person have/ had one contact?

Methodical approach

This will be a qualitative study to research the primary motivation of the actors in the adhocracies. Within the paper you have just read, there is almost no understanding of the motivation of the concerned actors. To research the above stated research questions my opinion is that the best way to do this is to make use of a qualitative method of research. This kind of research is used to describe and interpret data, situations and events in a more qualitative way (Baarda et.al 1996, Passas 2002). I will use file research and half structured interviews. So it would be a form of ethnographic research in which I will examine data and materials that are collected through data collection methods as open interviews (primary data, first hand material) and earlier collected documents (secondary data, second hand material). This on the basis of police and justice department files. Documents of authorities and files of police and justice are mostly the primary source of organized criminality (Kleemans et.al.1998). These administrations have not been made for scientific investigation and are in general put together with the purpose of prosecution (Bijleveld 2004). The authorities collect facts that can be relevant for punishment affairs and they don't collect these facts with the aim of serving as investigation instrument in sociological and criminological examination.

Ethnographic research thus, is the departing point. In this type of research, the researcher will get involved and embedded in the environment. To be a part of the social context of the actors of the heroin adhocracies for a longer time (because many of them will not be direct accessible). The aim of 'hanging around' is that the actors will get more acquainted and used to the researcher and in that way they will hopefully reach a certain level of trust. Gaining trust is a main goal. The researcher needs to get deeper into the subject within the conversations and in that way learn more about the perceptions, problems, motives and perspectives of the actors/respondents themselves.

Thus, it is important/of interest to recognize that the actors/respondents and their perspectives are utmost important. In this way, the researcher can build up the trust he needs for his research.

Before the interviews can begin, the research has to be started by tracing the begin population. This can be done for example, by searching police and justice department files for respondents. When tracing respondents and trying to get cooperation from them for the research, one can imagine that gaining trust, as said before, is tremendously important. Besides, the 'hard drugs merchants' we are now talking about are a group that has information about very sensitive matters. They will think twice about giving information to trusted people, let alone, a stranger who walks by and is talking 'some kind of research'. Only qualitative research can be used to build trust that is needed for executing the research. Because of the fact that a lot of respondents will be reserved in giving information to the researcher, trust is a necessary component in the relationship.

So, after forming the begin population of respondents and gaining trust, it would be a second step to use this social capital with the aim of finding new respondents. The research population is indeed a 'hard to find' group in sectors that are difficult accessible. That is why, by asking the respondents about their acquaintances, we can build up a bigger and wider research group.

Thus, first of all, preliminary investigation will take place. After this we will try to get embedded and find respondents and we will use the snowball method to reach more respondents. The possibility that qualitative investigation gives the researcher is that one must and can enter the scene as an unwritten leaf, purely blank. I will use half structured interviews. A half structured interview is an example of an open interview by which the questions and answer are not fixed but only the subject is fixed. A half structured interview begins with a broad opening question which makes it possible for the respondent to tell about his perceptions, experiences and also to talk about a particular subject. It is important to ventilate the intentions from the story of the respondent. After that the interviewer has to make the details explicit by asking to the points. In this way the researcher can ask further about the more important and unclear components in the story of the respondent.

As said before, in the research. I will use different data collection methods. In social science, we call this triangulation of data collection, or multimethod approach. Use of the method of triangulation is important because every method of investigation has its weak sides. If we look through different perspectives of different data collecting methods we can get a better image of the complete situation and in that way have a better focus. The aim of triangulation is thus also that the data that is collected becomes more valid.

#### *Reliability, internal validity and external validity*

The advantages of open interviews are the following: they are flexible, they demand a fast preparation and they are relatively cheap. There is space for motivations, emotions and the perspective of respondents. Another advantage is that the answers can also be placed within a wider social context.

Disadvantage are that it is a time-consuming manner of doing research. Because of the fact that the researcher is the instrument and also human, the project must be executed by a trained researcher. Furthermore this researcher must use qualitatively good data registration and data-analysis equipment. A certain 'colouring' of investigation material is not easy to prevent, but can be limited as much as possible so that the reliability of the investigation increases.

As said before, I want to use the method of triangulation of data. This assures a better reliability of the research data. The question of the right correspondence between the collected data and the reality is the question of the internal validity of the investigation material. Consequently: do you have a good image of the research situation and do you have a good answer on your definition of the problem? Qualitative investigation is a good method to assure the internal validity. Just because of the fact that in the qualitative research the existing situation is investigated. Because qualitative research does not investigate a large population there is something to be noticed with relation to the external validity, consequently the generalizability. Is the outcome of the investigation generalizable to the rest of the population? In our case the found results have to be generalizable to the rest of 'the heroin adhocracies (we hereby address to content generalization). One of wick as a researcher will never be really certain. Generalizability is only possible if you would examine the entire population. A disadvantage can be that the researcher sticks with this group and doesn't get curious about other groups he is not examining.

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### **Internet**

[www.geopium.org](http://www.geopium.org)

[www.unodc.org](http://www.unodc.org) (UNODC World Drug Report 2004)

[www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm](http://www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm)

### **Lectures**

Dr. D. Zaitch (2004). *Transnational Organized Crime*. Erasmus University Rotterdam

Prof dr. J. Burgers (2005). *Urban Sociology*. Erasmus University Rotterdam

## Appendix

Bron Akgündüz A., (2000). 'Turkije en internationale migratie'. In *Justitiële verkenningen*, jrg. 26, nr. 8.

Tabel 1

### Tabel 3: Schatting van het aantal Turken dat zich tussen 1961 en 1999 elders in Europa heeft gevestigd, per periode en type migratie\*

Arbeidsmigratie 1961-1974	Gezinshereniging 1973-1980	Gezinsvorming 1980-1999	Asielaanvragen 1980-1999
1.000.000	1.200.000	500.000	579.510

\* Geeft een ruwe schatting weer. Ofschoon zowel de arbeidsmigratie als de migratie in verband met gezinshereniging/-vorming naar Europa een zeker percentage van terugkeermigratie bevat wordt hier het totale aantal personen dat op een gegeven moment Europa introk in beschouwing genomen, niet hun daaropvolgende gedragingen:

Figure 1.1

### GLOBAL OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION 1990-2003 (ha)




Figure 1.2



Figure 2.1 Bron: <http://www.pa-chouvy.org/JIR4.jpg> (vrijdag 13 mei 2005)




Figure 2.2




Figure 3

Bron: [http://www.pa-chouvy.org/ZOOM\\_east.pdf](http://www.pa-chouvy.org/ZOOM_east.pdf) (vrijdag 13 mei 2005)




Figure 4

Bron: <http://www.pa-chouvy.org/JIR3.jpg> (vrijdag 13 mei 2005)

